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IN THE SUPREME COUPT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK S. COOPER,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 20703
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant presents two issues for review by this Court:
1.

Did the District Court err when it ruled that a

lender must ccnirence foreclosure within one (1) year after
learning

cf

contained m
2.
were

a

violation

of

the

"due-on-sale"

clause

the lender's Deed of Trust?

Did the District Court err when it held that there

legal grounds

for an award

of

attorney's

fees to

Plaintiff/Respondent?
STATEMENT OF CASE
j

On June 5, 1984, the Appellant, Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan Association (hereinafter referred to as "Deseret
Federal"),
property
Default

recorded

located
alleged

a Notice

in Utah

of Default

County, Utah.

a violation

affecting

real

The Notice

of

in the "due-on-sale" clause

contained in Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust securing the
subject real property.
Respondent,

Jack

S.

(R.7-8).

Cooper

On August 29, 1984, the

(hereinafter

referred

to as

"Cooper11) , filed a Complaint in Fourth Judicial District
Court seeking an injunction to enjoin Deseret Federal from
foreclosing under the recorded Notice of Default.
A non-jury trial was held on February 28, 1985.
took the matter under advisement.
1985,

the

Court

rendered

its

(R.91-95).

Decision

(R.l-6).
The Court

On April 5,

that

Cooper was

entitled to a permanent injunction against Deseret Federal,
plus his costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
Findings

of

reflecting
1985.

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law,

(R.143-150).
and

Judgment

the Court's decision were entered on May 17,

(R. 153-160).

It is from that Judgment that Deseret

Federal now appeals by seeking a reversal.

(P.163-164).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Deseret Federal was the beneficiary and trustee under a
Deed of Trust executed by Cooper and his wife on jApril 15,
1976.

The Deed of Trust secured a Trust Deed Note in the

amount

of

$315,000.00

by

transferring,

in

trust, real

property located in Utah County, Utah. (R.58-62).
property

is

an

apartment

Monterey Drive, Orem, Utah.

complex

located

at

The real
625 North

(F. 177-178).

Contained in the subject Deed of Trust is a paragraph
commonly

referred

to

as

a

lf

due-on-sale,f

clause.

paragraph reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
If all or any part of the property or an
interest therein is sold or transferred by
-2-

The

Borrower without Lender's prior written
consent
, Lender may, at Lenderf s
option, declare all the sums secured by
this Deed of Trust to be immediately due
and payable, (R.61).
(A complete copy of the subject "due-on-sale" clause is
attached hereto as Appendix "A").
Cooper sold the subject real property to a Gary Douglas
Ford (hereinafter referred to as "Ford")
Estate Contract in Kay of 1978.

by Uniform F.eal

Neither Cooper, nor Ford,

obtained the "prior written consent" of Deseret Federal for
the

sale.

(R.144).

apartment

complex

Thus,

the May,

violated

the

1978

sale

"due-on-sale"

of

the

clause

contained in Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust.
Deseret Federal was first informed of a transfer of
Cooper's

apartment

complex

when the lender received

an

insurance binder naming Ford as the owner in April of 1979.
(R.15M.
through

Deseret Federal was also informed of the transfer
communivations which occurred between Ford, Cooper

and employees of Deseret Federal throughout the year 1981.
(P.154) .
In June of 1981, Deseret Federal made the decision to
accelerate the obligation secured by the Deed of Trust by
reason

of

the

default

caused

by

the

apartment complex from Cooper to Ford.

transfer

of

the

A letter declaring

such an acceleration was mailed on or about June 22, 1981.
However,

neither

Cooper,

letter.

(F.53-54, 65-66).

nor

Ford,

claimed

the

mailed

A follow-up letter was sent to

Cooper and Ford on or about August 18, 1981, which again
-«/ —

stated Deseret Federal's desire to accelerate the subject
loan.

(R.144 and Defendant's Exhibit #16).
Sometime

after mailing

the August

18, 1981 letter,

Deseret Federal began holding discussions with Ford about
assuming the Cooper loan.

In December of 1981, Ford made

formal application with Deseret Federal to assume the loan.
(R.144).

Negotiations

continued.
sometime

between

Ford

and

Deseret

Terms of the Ford assumption were
in

the

Spring

of

1982.

A

Federal

completed

critical

part

of

assumption was that Cooper would transfer to Ford any escrow
funds Deseret Federal held in connection with the subject
loan.

Papers were drafted

to consummate the assumption.

However, in Hay of 1982, Cooper refused to consent to a
transfer

of

the

escrcw

funds

to

Ford.

Thus,

"due-on-sale" assumption loan by Ford and resulting
of che defaulted clause failed to occur.

the

,f

cureM

(R.284-288).

Ey Spring of 1982, an additional default in the terms
of

Deseret

Federal's

loan

had

occurred.

Payments

of

principal and interest on the Trust Deed Note had become
delinquent.

Further,

Ford

had

failed

to

make

timely

payments to Cooper pursuant to their Uniform Peal Estate
Contract.

On October 1, 1982, Ford filed a petition in

bankruptcy

under

Chapter

11

of

the

Bankruptcy

Code.

(R.144-145) . As a result thereof, both Deseret Federal and
Cooper were

automatically

stayed

from

foreclosing

respective interests in the apartment complex.
362(a)(4).
-4-

their

11 U.S.C.§

On or about September 18, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court
entered an Order modifying the Bankruptcy Court's automatic
stay and permitting Cooper to complete foreclosure of his
Uniform

Real

complex.

Estate

Contract

on

the

subject

apartment

An action to foreclose said contract had been

filed by Cooper against Ford in the Fourth Judicial District
Court.

(R.71-73).

The Cooper foreclosure was completed on

February 1, 1984 when Cooper purchased the apartment complex
at sheriff's sale.
sale,

the

(R.155).

bankruptcy

stay

As a result of the sheriff's
no

longer

prevented

Deseret

Federal from enforcing its rights under the subject Deed of
Trust by foreclosure since the apartment complex was no
longer

property

of

the

Ford

bankruptcy

estate.

11

U.S.C.§362(a).
On February 10, 1984, Deseret Federal, by letter, again
asserted its right to accelerate the loan by reason of the
default in the "due-on-sale" clause.

(R.67-68).

That on or

about April 16, 1984, Cooper tendered to Deseret Federal
sufficient

funds

interest aid

to

bring

the

payments

of

principal,

escrow current on the subject loan.

However,

the tender was conditioned upon Deseret Federal waiving the
provisions of the "due-on-sale" clause.
was

refused.

(F.155,325-332) .

Thus, the tender

Cooper

did

bring

the

payments of interest and principal current unconditionally
during the course of this litigation.

(R.156).

Deseret Federal and Cooper were unable to resolve their
dispute over the "due-on-sale" violation.

Thus, Deseret

Federal

recorded

(R.69-70).

a Notice

of Default

on June

5, 1984,

Cooper filed a Complaint against Deseret Federal

requesting an injunction to prevent Deseret Federal from
foreclosing its Deed of Trust by reason of the default under
the "due-on-sale" clause.

The District Court granted such

an injunction and awarded Cooper his costs and attorney's
fees.

(R.159-160).

Deseret Federal here seeks a reversal of the District
Court's

Judgment.

Such

a

reversal would

allow Deseret

Federal to accelerate the subject loan by reason of the
"due-on-sale" clause violation, to complete the foreclosure
process and

collect its reasonable attorney's fees.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

After the transfer of the subject real property had
occurred in violation of the "due-on-sale" clause contained
in

Deed of Trust, Deseret Federal timely accelerated the

subject loan by commencing a non-judicial foreclosure of the
Deed of Trust.

The District Court erred when it ruled that

Deseret Federal must commence foreclosure of the subject
loan within one year after being informed of a violation in
the "due-on-sale" clause under the Deed of Trust.

Further,

the District Court erred when it held that there were
sufficient legal grounds for the awarding of attorney's fees
to Cooper.

There is no statutory or contractual basis for

such an award.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

Many

DESERET FEDERAL TIMELY ACCELERATED ITS LOAN
FOLLOWING A VIOLATION IN THE LOAN'S
"DUE-ON-SALE" CLAUSE,

Courts

redefine

the

have
law

recently

had

regarding

the

opportunity

enforceability

of

to
and

interpretation of "due-on-sale" clauses contained in Deeds
of Trust.

In a very thoughtful analysis, this Court held in

Redd v. Western Savings j.nd Loan Company, 646 P.2d
(Utah,

1982),

that

absent

legislative

ff

due-on-saletf clause is enforceable as

agreement.

761

restrictions,

a

part of a bargained

Since Deseret Federal is a federally chartered

savings and loan association, any legislative restriction to
the effectiveness cf the "due-on-sale11 clause contained in
the subject Deed cf Trust must be found in federal law.

See

Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Associa_tion v. Peginald D.
De Sa Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
Legistative

restrictions

to enforceability

of "due-

on-sale" clauses were not the basis cf Plaintiff Jack S.
Cooper's complaint against Deseret Fed|eral.

Instead, Cooper

argued that Deseret Federal waited too long to accelerate
its loan because of the default in the "due-on-sale" clause;
and

thus, by

reason of laches, estoppel

and/or waiver,

Deseret Federal is now barred from accelerating the loan.
Conversely,
accelerated

Deseret

Federal

argues

the subject loan after

that

it

timely

learning of the real

property transfer from Cooper to Ford.

The District Court

concluded

have recorded its

that Deseret

Federal
-7-

should

Notice of Default, accelerating the loan, within one year
after learning of the offensive transfer.

Such a conclusion

is reversible error.
The recording of a Notice of Default, along with all
non-judicial foreclosure procedures, is governed by Utah's
Trust Deed

Statute, U.C. A. §§57-1-19, et. seq.

(1953, as

airended) .

That statute provides the specific time frame

within which a lender must record a Notice of Default.
U.C.A.§57-1-34 reads as follows:

The trustee's sale of property under a trust
deed shall be made, or an action to foreclosure
a trust deed as provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property
shall be commenced, within the period prescribed
by l&w for the commencement of_an action" on
trie obligation" secured by tKe~trust~ deed. [Emphasis
added].
The obligation secured by the subject Deed of Trust is
a Trust Deed Note, a written obligation.

Thus, the time by

which Deseret Federal must conduct its trustee's sale under
the

recorded

Notice

of

Default

is

governed

by

U.C.A.§78-12-23(2), which reads as follows:
Within six years - Within six years...
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing, except those mentioned in the
preceding section.
Because Deseret Federal first learned of the default by
Cooper of the "due-on-sale" clause in April, 1979, Deseret
Federal would have, by reason of the appropriate Statute of
Limitations, until April, 1985, to conduct its trustee's
sale.

Further,

this

period

ot

-8-

time was

tolled because

Deseret

Federal

has

been

enjoined

from

conducting

a

trustee's sale by the District Court since September 2, 1984
and Deseret Federal was stayed by Ford's Bankruptcy from
recording a Notice of Default between October 1, 1982 and
February 1, 1984.
Cooper has asserted that the doctrine of laches, not
the Statute of Limitations, restricts the time within which
Deseret Federal must accelerate its loan.

See Malouff v.

Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association,, 509 P.2d 1240
(Colo., 1973).
case law.

However, such an argument is counter to Utah

In F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc.,

17 U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, (1965), the Plaintiff had filed
a

mortgage

foreclosure

action

against

Defendant.

The

Defendant raised the doctrine of laches as a defense to the
mortgage foreclosure.

This Court rejected such a defense

and held:
Neither is the defense of laches of any
avail to the defendant. Sec. 78-12-23, U.C.A.
1953, which provides for a six year statute of
limitations en obligations in writing is
applicable zo the promissory note and to the
mortgage. It had two years yet to run when this
action was commenced. Even though the foreclosure
action is equitable in nature, it is practically
the invariable rule that laches cannot be a
defense before the statutory limitations
has expired. 404 P.2d at 673.
The legislature had established what it felt to be a
"reasonable time11 within which a lender must commence a
non-judicial foreclosure when it enacted U.C.A-. §57-1-34 and
§78-12-23.
its

concept

It is inappropriate for a Court to substitute
of

a

"reasonable
-Q_

time11

for

that

of

the

legislature.

Yet, that is exactly what the District Court

did when it ruled that Deseret Federal should have recorded
its Notice of Default within one(l) year of learning of the
subject property transfer . Thus, this Court should reverse
the District Court's Judgment.

During the course of litigation on this matter, Cooper
has often used the terms "waiver", "estoppel" and "laches"
as if these concepts were interchangeable.
legal concepts are very different.

In fact, these

However, it is Deseret

Federal's position that the facts as found by the District
Court support a conclusion

that Deseret Federal did not

waive its rights under the subject "due-on-sale" clause and
that Deseret Federal is not estopped

from asserting its

rights under that clause.
This Court has defined waiver in the case
Ins. Co. v. Health, 90 Ut

of Phoenix

187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936).

In that

case, the Court held:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right...To constitute a waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit,
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence
and an intention to relinquish it. It must
be distinctly made, although it may be express
or implied. 61 P.2d 312.
The
indicates

evidence
that

before

Deseret

the

Federal

District
took

Court

express

clearly
steps

to

demonstrate that it was not going to waive its rights under
the "due-on-sale" clause.

At every opportunity, Deseret

Federal stated that it had accelerated the subject loan by
-10-

reason of default under the "due-on-sale" clause.

The only

evidence that Cooper presented in support of his claim that
Deseret Federal waived its rights under the clause is the
fact that Deseret Federal had accepted payments of principal
and interest under the subject note after having accelerated
the loan.

However, the mere acceptance of principal and

interest payments is not a waiver of any rights under a
M

due-on-saleM clause.

Bakker v. Empire Savings and Loan

Association, 634 P.?d 1021 (Colo., 1981).
The doctrine of estoppel, like the doctrine of waiver,
applies only when certain

criteria are satisfied.

This

Court described the doctrine of estoppel in J. P. Koch, Inc.
v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah, 1975), as
follows:
It is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party
from deluding or inducing another into a
position where he will unjustly suffer loss.
On applicable here, the test is whether there
is conduct, by act or omission, by which one
party knowingly leads another party, reasonably
acting thereon, to take some course of action,
which will result in his detriment or damage
if the first party is permitted to repudiate
or deny his conduct or representation. 534
P.2d 905.
The only conduct of Deseret Federal for which this
doctrine could apply is the fact that Deseret Federal did
not choose to accelerate the loan between April, 1979 and
June, 1981. However, there is n£ evidence of record to show
how Cooper relied upon said lack of acceleration or to show
how Cooper changed his position because of such conduct
which would result in his detriment.
-11-

In fact, Cooper argued

at time of trial that he did not have to prove that he was
"harmed" by the delay.
of estoppel.

(R. 385-386).

This is not the law

Thus, it is clear from

the evidence that

neither the doctrine of estoppel or waiver is applicable to
the case at hand.

A sad effect of the District Court's ruling in this
matter is that it discourages negotiations between parties.
Deseret

Federal negotiated with Ford

September,

1981

and

Fay,

1982

and Cooper between

for

the

purposes

of

consumating an assumption of the subject loan by Ford.

The

negotiations

his

ended

when

Cooper

refused

interest in an escrow account to Ford.

to

assign

During that period

of time, Deseret Federal did not record a Notice of Default,
nor

refer

the

(R.283-284).

matter

to

an

attorney

for

resolution.

However, it would now be more prudent for

lenders to record their Notices of Default immediately upon
learning of a default in a ndue-on-salef! clause and then
negotiate with these various parties.

Of course, this would

add to the expenses of an assumption.
Because of the transfer of the subject real property
from Cooper to Ford, Deseret Federal was within its rights
to

accelerate

passing

of

barred

from

the

loan.

time, Cooper
asserting

Relying
argued

its

exclusively

that Deseret

rights

under

a

upon

the

Federal is

ff

due-on-salefl

clause because of laches, waiver and/or estoppel.

However,

the Utah legislature has specified a six(6) year limitation
-12-

for

lenders

accelerating

their

loans.

Deseret

Federal

clearly acted

within the statutory time constraint when it

recorded

Notice

its

of Default.

Therefore, this Court

should reverse the Distric Court's judgment and order a
dismissal with prejudice of Cooper's complaint.

POINT II: THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR CONTRACTUAL
BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Under the "American Rule", a litigant is only entitled
to an award of attorney's fees if a statute or contract so
provides.

B & R Supply Company v. S. M. Bringhurst, 28 U.2d

442, 503 P2d 1216 (1972).
an

attorney's

fee

of

The District Court awarded Cooper

$3,840.00.

However,

there

is no

evidence in the record to support a legal basis for this
award.
The District Court in its Decision and Conclusions of
Law makes no reference to statutory authority for an award
of attorney's fees.
controlling

statute

Cooper's counsel has not pointed to any
which

would

allow

such

an

award.

Deseret Federal's review of the record and statutes can
determine no conceivable basis

for the District Court's

award.
The

contract

between

Deseret

Federal

and

Cooper

consists of two (2) documents, a Deed of Trust and Trust
Deed Note.

Both of these documents provided attorney's fees

for Deseret Federal.

Neither of these documents provide for

attorney's fees for Cooper.

-13-

The language which permits Deseret Federal to collect
its attorney's fees is contained in paragraph 18 of the Deed
of Trust which reads as follows:
Trustee [Deseret Federal] shall apply the proceeds
of the Sale in the followng order: (a) to all
reasonable costs and expenses of the sale,
including, but not limited to, reasonable
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs of title
evidence...
The remedies provided to Deseret Federal in paragraph 18 are
specifically

referred

(paragraph 17).

to

in

the

"due-on-sale"

clause

Additionally, paragraph 18 provides:

Lender [Deseret Federal] shall be entitled to
collect all reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in pursuing the remedies provided
in this paragraph 18, including, but not
limited to, attorney's fees.
None of the wording in either the Deed of Trust or the Trust
Deed

Note

borrower.

provides

an

award

of

attorney's

fees

to

a

Cooper cannot rely upon a contract for an award

of attorney's fees.
Since

there

is neither

statutory

authority, nor a

contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees to Cooper,
the District Court's judgment is in error.

Deseret Federal

seeks reversal.

CONCLUSION
Cooper was granted an injunction to prevent Deseret
Federal from foreclosing

a Deed of Trust because of an

admitted default in "due-on-sale" clause.

Deseret Federal

respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District
-14-

Court's injunction and order a dismissal with prejudice of
Cooper's complaint.

A reversal will permit Deseret Federal

to accelerate the Cooper loan and complete its non-judicial
foreclosure.

Further, Cooper was awarded a judgment against

Deseret Federal for his attorney's fees.

Deseret Federal

also requests a reversal of this judgment.
Respectfully

submitted

this

day

of February,

1986.

GARRETT AND STURDY

Joseph E. Hatch
Attorney fcr Appellant

-15-

APPENDIX "A"

17 • Transfer of the Property; Assumption,
If all or any part of the' Property or an interest
therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without
Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the
creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to
this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of a purchase
money security interest for household appliances,
(c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation
of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the
grant of any leasehold interest of three years or
less not containing an option to purchase, Lender
may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately
due and payable. Lender shall have waived such
option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or
transfer, Lender and the person to whom the
Property is to be sold or transferred reach
agreement in writing that the credit of such
person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed
of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall
request.
If Lender has waived the option to
accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a
written assumption agreement accepted in writing
by Lender, Lender shall release borrower from all
obligations under this Deed of Trkist and the Note.
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate,
Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration
in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof.
Such
notice shall provide a period of not less than 30
days from the date the notice is mailed within
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If
Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the
expiration of such period, Lender may, without
further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any
remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof.
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APPENDIX "B

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JACK S. COOPER,

Civil No, 67397

Plaintiff,
vs.

D E C I S I O N

DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on the 28th day of
February, 1985.

H. Grant Ivins, Esq. appeared for the plaintiff and

Joseph E. Hatch, Esq. appeared for the defendant.

The parties pre-

sented their evidence and oral arguments to the Court, which directed
that formal citations of authority be submitted by Mr. Hatch allowing
time for Mr. Ivins to answer if deemed appropriate, and the Court
having received such citations and further argument from Mr. Hatch and
having taken the matter under advisement, now enters its:
DECISION
There is very little dispute in the evidence.

The following is a

summary of the Court's findings.
The plaintiff, Jack S. Cooper, was the original borrower from
defendant in April of 1976, at which time the trust deed securing the
defendant's loan to Cooper contained the following covenant:
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"17. Transfer of property; Assumption. If all or any
part of the property or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by borrower without lender's prior written consent, exluding . . . lender may at lender's option, declare
all the sums secured by this deed of trust to be immediately
due and payable . . . ."
In May of 1978 plaintiff sold by a Uniform Real Estate Contract
to Gary Douglas Ford, trustee, the property in question, which
secured the defendant's loan to Cooper.

Neither plaintiff nor Ford

obtained "prior written consent" for the sale.
In April, 1979, the file on this loan reflects an insurance
binder being issued stating Ford to be the owner of the subject
property.

This binder was noted on an indexing card and the actual

binder placed in the file.

(Cooper also testified he and Ford talked

to an official at Deseret Federal about the sale going through and no
one advised that a due-on-sale clause would be involved.)
In June, 1981, Ford was delinquent both to Deseret Federal on
the original loan, and to Cooper on the real estate contract (or
second mortgage), and a due-on-sale notice was mailed to Cooper, which
Cooper denies having received, and for which defendant cannot produce
proof of mailing.

(Undelivered Certified Mail dated August 18,

apparently with a notice of due-on-sale claim was undelivered and
apparently addressed to a questionable location in Orem, Utah).
Defendant continued to meet with Ford to work out his assumption
of the loan to cure the due-on-sale requirement and in December, 1981
Ford made a formal application for the assumption of the subject loan.
Continued negotiations occurred, and in May, when plaintiff was asked
-18-

to release his escrowed funds to apply on Ford's delinquencies to
defendant, Cooper refused.
Nothing further appears to have occurred concerning this matter
until October 1, 1982, when Ford filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Thereafter plaintiff made efforts to and finally did obtain a release
of the property from the bankruptcy court on or about September 18th,
1983, and Cooper completed his foreclosure on or about February 1,
1984, when he was the successful bidder at the Sheriff1s sale and
title to the property subject to the trust deed in question was vested
back in him.
On February, 10, 1984, Deseret Federal sent to and Jack Cooper
received a letter notifying him of their awareness of the sale of the
subject property (to Ford in 1978) and a declaration of defendant's
election to declare the entire balance ($295,247.42) due and payable
pursuant to paragraph 17 of the trust deed.

The notice provided two

alternatives to foreclosure, which was indicated would be commenced
within thirty days if neither remedies there set forth were "chosen".
In June, 1984, Deseret Federal recorded its Notice of Default
covering the due-on-sale clause, to begin its non-judicial trust deed s
The Court also finds from the evidence presented that during the
course of this litigation and with some reservation between counsel
that it would not have an effect on the waiver claimed by the plaintifi
substantial money has been paid to defendant by plaintiff in an effort
to bring the loan in question current.

It is also part of the record

in this proceeding that a tender has been made to defendant by plaintiff of some $77,000.00 in addition to the $101,955.00 paid on
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December 27, 1984 to bring the loan fully current as of a point after
litigation had commenced.
It is the plaintiff's position that the failure of the defendant
to make an election to declare the loan due and payable because of the
sale to Ford for a period of approximately five years counting the
period of the bankruptcy, constitutes a waiver of the right to avail
itself of that provision in the trust deed.
It is the position of the defendant that after a sale they have
the right at any time within the period of the loan to exercise the
due-on-sale

provision when such sale is contrary to the restrictions of

paragraph 17.
In resolving the issues, the Court enters the following Conclusions of Law from the above Findings of Fact:
1.

That the due-on-sale provision in the trust deed

securing defendant's' loan to plaintiff became operative as
of the sale to Ford in May of 1978.
2.

That the defendant had actual or constructive

notice of the aforesaid sale to Ford as of April, 1979/
when it received notice of the change of owners through
an insurance binder.
3.

That further notice of the sale was brought

to the attention of defendant through conversations
between Mr. Ford and Mr. Cooper with agents of defendant
over a period of 1981, which resulted in letters from
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defendant to Cooper dated June 22, 1981, and August 14,
1981.

Also, conversations with Jean Carter and Ford in

October and other communications with Ford in November
and December, 1981, and January and May of 198 2, clearly
establish the knowledge on the part of defendant that the
sale had occurred and their option to exercise due-on-sale,
or affect other remedies had matured.
4.

The due-on-sale provision in Section 17 of the

trust deed is a provision entitling the lender to
accelerate the unpaid balance of an installment loan when a
sale occurs.
5.

The Court concludes that to fail to exercise the

due-on-sale clause of the trust deed by recording the
Notice of Default and initiating either judicial or nonjudicial trust deed foreclosure within one year after
notice of a sale in violation of the due-on-sale provision
is not exercising the option within a reasonable time,
which the law would require, since no other time provision
for the exercise is specified in the trust deed.
6.

The Court further concludes that the failure of

defendant to accelerate the obligation under the due-on-sale
clause until after plaintiff had foreclosed the rights of
Ford and had succeeded to title to the property affects a
waiver of defendant's rights to proceed under the due-on-21-

sale clause# and in addition thereto amounts to an estoppel
against defendant to proceed toforeclose atthis time.
Defendant had knowledge of its right to accelerate the
obligation as of April, 1979 and repeatedly thereafter
through the time plaintiff foreclosed against Ford, and
intentionally sat back, negotiated, but but did not
choose to assert its right while allowing the plaintiff to
proceed with the expenditure of time and legal costs to
protect his interests in the property.)
The Court has reviewed the decisions cited by counsel, and
although none of them appear to show as extreme fact situation as is
evident in the case before the Court, there are many decisions concerning what constitutes a reasonable time to exercise the right to
accelerate an obligation due to the violation of a provision in a
trust deed or mortgage, and the periods involved in the case before
the Court run well beyond what the decisions say a reasonable time
is where time is not otherwise limited in thfe written documents. The
case of Malouff v. Midland Federal Saving and Loan Association (1973),
181 Col. 294, 509 P. 2d 1240, holds that " . . . under an ordinary
acceleration clause in a mortgage or trust deed, the obligee has a
reasonable time after the default or the event which gives rise to the
right to accelerate."

Even though that case directs a case-by-case

determination as to what a reasonable time is, the circumstances of
the case before this Court would indicate a dlear violation of a
reasonable time to accelerate under such a clause, be it due-on-sale or
-23-

other default in the security documents of a loan.
Other cases cited by counsel for the plaitiff are most persuasive
to the Court and whether the conduct in not exercising the acceleration
within a reasonable time constitutes a waiver, amounts to an estoppel o
assesses laches against the party whose actions are tardy, a particular
analysis of the fact of this case would indicate a clear conclusion tha
defendants waited too long.

The rights accorded a lender by virtue of

due-on-sale clause does not include carte blanche on a particular loan
to watch the entire climate of interest rates for a thirty year period
and at some likely point deemed most advantageous to the lender, requir
an adjustment or foreclosure from the borrower.
Based on the foregoing the Court concludes that plaintiff is
entitled to the relief requested in his Complaint prohibiting the
defendant from proceeding in its attempt to exercise its due-on-sale
clause for the sale occuring in 1978, and that the defendant be Ordered
to accept plaintiff's tender to bring the loan current and that he not
be charged any penalty interest or late charges from the date of his
tender of the balance to accomplish that^which was on the 16th day of
April, 1984. I The Court further finds that the plaintiff is entitled to
be compensated for the fees and charge of his attorney in this matter
and_the Affidavit filed by his counsel and not controverted by defense
counsel establishes the ^sum of $31840.00 ac a reasonable sum to be
———

*

———

•»

awarded^o the plaintiff for the use and benefit of his attorney, plus
the costs of this action.
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate Findings
-24-

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order consistant with the
foregoing Decision.

.

Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this

^

day of April, 1985.

GEOgfJJE E. BALLIF, ^UDGE
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APPENDIX "C"
HEBER GRANT IVINS
Attorney for Plaintiff
75 North Center
American Fork, UT
84003
Telephone:
(801) 756-6071
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oooOoooJACK S. COOPER,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 67,397
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
-oooOoooTHIS MATTER came on regularly for trial on the 28tl
day of February, 1985;

the plaintiff appearing in person

and through his counsel, Heber Grant Ivins;

the defendant

appearing with officers of the corporation and through their
counsel, Joseph E. Hatch;

the parties presented

and oral arguments to the Court;

evidence

and after due deliberation

the Court does enter the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on April 15, 1976, the plaintiff

borrowed

the sum of $315,000 from the defendant and executed a trust
deed and a trust deed note, which, among other provisions,
contained a non-assumption provision which read as follows:

IER G R A N T

IVINS

TOUNty

AT LAW
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"17. Transfer of property; Assumption. If
all or any part of the property or an interest therein
is sold or transferred by borrower without lender's prio
written consent, excluding...lender may at lender's
option, declare all the sums secured by this deed of
trust to be immediately due and payable...."
2.

In May, 1978, the plaintiff sold, by Uniform

Real Estate Contract, the 24-unit apartment complex which was
the collateral provided to the defendant, to one Gary Douglas
Ford, and at the time of said sale, the due-on-sale provision
in the trust deed, securing defendant's loan to plaintiff,
became operative.
3.

That the defendant had actual or constructive

notice of the aforesaid sale to Ford in April, 1979, when
it received notice of the change of owners through an insuranc
binder which was present in the file of the defendant.
4.

That further notice of the sale was brought

to the attention of the defendant through conversations betwee
Gary Ford, the purchaser, and Mr. Cooper, with agents of the
defendants throughout 1981, which resulted in letters from
defendant to Cooper dated June 22, 1981, and August 14, 1981.
Also, conversations were had with one Jean Carter, and agent
of the defendant, and Gary Ford in October, 1981, and other
communications with Ford occurred in November and December
of 1981 and January and May of 1982, which clearly establishes
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the sale had
occurred and their option to exercise the due-on-sale provisio
or other remedies had matured.
GRANT IVINS
1M.Y AT U W
HTM CINTCR
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5.

That the due-on-sale provision in Section 17

of the trust deed is a provision entitling the lender to acc<
erate the unpaid balance of an installment loan when a sale
occurs.
6.

That the purchaser, Gary Ford, became delinquer

on both the contract to the plaintiff and on the assumed obli
gation to the defendant, in early 1982.
7.

That the plaintiff filed a foreclosure against

Gary Ford on July 14, 1982, and the defendant was- served witt
a copy of said foreclosure on July 9, 1982.
8.

That the purchaser, Gary Ford, filed a Chapter

11 bankruptcy on October 1, 1982, which resulted in an autom<
tic stay being issued by the bankruptcy court.

The stay was

set aside on September 18, 1983.
9.

That the foreclosure action of the plaintiff

against Gary Ford was completed and the property was sold
by the sheriff.of Utah County on February 1, 1984, and was
purchased by the plaintiff at said sale.
10.

That on or about February 10, 1984, defendant

sent plaintiff a letter asserting a violation of the due-onsale clause and accelerating the loan.
11.

That on April 16-, 1984, the plaintiff tenderec

to the defendant a check in the amount of $77,813.00, which
amount was represented to be sufficient to bring the plaintiff's note current.
H GRANT

IVINS
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12.

That on June 5, 1984, the defendant recorded

in the office of the Utah County Recorder its notice of
default.
13.

That on December 27, 1984, the plaintiff paid

and the defendant accepted the sum of $101,955.00, which
brought the loan fully current as of that date.
14.

That the plaintiff's counsel has expended a

total of 64 hours in the preparation and trial of this matter,
and that $60.00 an hour is a reasonable charge for said attorney.
15.

That the sum of $455.71 costs have been expen-

ded in this action.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the failure of the defendant to exercise

the due-on-sale clause of the trust deed by recording the
notice of default and initiating either a judicial or
non-judicial trust deed foreclosure for approximately four
years after notice of a sale in violation of the due-on-sale
provision is not exercising the option within a reasonable
time, which the law requires, and when no other time provision
for the exercise of said right is specified in the trust deed.
2.

That the failure of the defendant to accelerate

the obligation under the due-on-sale clause until after plaintiff had foreclosed the rights of Gary Ford and had succeeded
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to title to the property effects a waiver of defendant's rig
to proceed with their due on sale clause, and in addition
thereto amounts to an estoppel against the defendant to proc
to foreclose at this time.
3.

That the plaintiff's loan with the defendant

was brought current by the payment of $101,955.00 as of the
27th day of December, 1984.
4.

That the defendant does not, by virtue of a

due-on-sale clause in a trust deed, have carte blanche right
to monitor the climate of interest rates for the period of
said loan and at some point deemed most advantageous to the
defendant require an adjustment or foreclosure from the
borrower.
5.

That the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent

order restraining the defendant from proceeding with its tr
deed foreclosure action, and further, requiring them to ace
payments pursuant to the original terms of the trust deed
and trust deed note signed in April of 1976.
6.

That the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of

$3,840.00 as attorney's fees for the use and benefit of his
attorney, plus $455.71 as costs.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Judge
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APPENDIX "D"

HEBER GRANT IVINS
Attorney for Plaintiff
75 North Center
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-6071
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oooOoooJACK S. COOPER,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 67,397

DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
-oooOoooTHIS MATTER came on regularly for trial on the 28th
day of February, 1985; the plaintiff appearing in person
and through his counsel, Heber Grant Ivins ; the 'defendant
appearing with officers of the corporation and through their
counsel, Joseph £. Hatch;

the parties presented evidence

and oral arguments to the Court; and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law having heretofore been entered,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
the defendant be, and is hereby, ordered and enjoined from
taking further action upon the foreclosure of the trust deed
which has been commenced and is now pending, and
FURTHER, the defendant is ordered to accept and
comply with the terms of the original trust deed and trust
kNT

IVINS

deed note executed by the plaintiff in April pf 1976.
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Plaintiff is entitled to and is hereby awarded judgment against the defendant in the amount of
$3,840.00 for the use and benefit of his attorney, together
with $455.71 in costs.

DATED this / T ^ a a y of /j(\\1\
BY THE COURT:

Judge

I GRANT IVINS
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Ml

1985.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of February,
1986, I mailed

four

(A) true and correct copies of the

foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to:
Mr. Heber Grant Ivins
Attorney at Law
75 North Center Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
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